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Commentary
ON THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL EXPRESSIVISM
ANDREW KOPPELMAN*
King Rex 111i was a racist and an anti-Semite. In his regime,
blacks and Jews were second-class citizens. Their official papers had
the words "BLACK" or 'JEW" stamped in large red letters on the
front. If they attempted to engage in any of a wide range of ordinary
activities, such as walking in the parks, they (and only they) were
fined. They were routinely denounced by official proclamations de-
claring their inferiority.
Happily, however, their inferior legal status had no tangible bad
consequences, because none of the citizens of Rex's kingdom shared
his racism and anti-Semitism. In fact, everyone regarded Rex as an
obnoxious idiot. When a private fund was formed to compensate
blacks and Jews for the fines that Rex levied from them, it was quickly
oversubscribed, so that none of those fines were actually borne by
their intended victims.2 (Rex's regime was otherwise benign, so the
citizens agreed that it was not worth the trouble to try to overthrow
him.) And, of course, the state's denunciations and official stigmatiza-
tions of blacks and Jews had no effect whatsoever on the larger cul-
ture, which was united in its hope that time and old age would soon
remove from the kingdom its last racist and anti-Semite. The white
Christian majority was not tempted to embrace Rex's views. Since the
blacks and Jews (like everyone else) had nothing but contempt for
Rex, their self-esteem was in no way compromised by Rex's ridiculous
laws.
Did the blacks andJews in Rex's regime have anything they could
reasonably complain about? Matthew Adler's recent critique of ex-
* Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University. A.B.,
University of Chicago; M.A., J.D., Ph.D., Yale University. Thanks to Matt Adler, Elizabeth
Anderson, Bob Bennett, and Steven D. Smith for helpful comments.
1. For the earlier history of the undistinguished line from which Rex was descended,
see LON L. FULLER, THE MoaITrrv OF LAw 33-38 (rev. ed. 1969).
2. The fund also compensated the blacks and Jews for their legal expenses, any
psychic distress they felt, and any disruption costs if their activities were actually stopped or
changed by Rex's laws. Thanks to Matt Adler for pointing out the need for this
clarification.
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pressive theories of law3 suggests that they did not. Legal status is not,
in itself, harmful, he argues, because it does not harm anyone's well-
being.4 Inferior legal status may harm well-being, either by damaging
one's self-respect, by lowering one's social status, or by diminishing
one's access to objective goods; but these causal contingencies may or
may not hold in any individual case.5 Whatever harm occurs will be a
causal consequence of the inferior legal status.6 The inferior legal sta-
tus is not itself constitutive of the harm.7
Adler's challenge to expressivism is marvelously rigorous and
clear, bringing a rare philosophical precision to these issues. The
conversation it has engendered promises to bring a new clarity to this
discourse. Although his work has already elicited considerable disa-
greement, his foundational challenge has not been adequately an-
swered.' In this Commentary, I will explain, in very brief compass,
why his attack on expressivism fails.
It may be helpful at the outset to clarify what is at stake in this
debate.' Adler acknowledges that rules of law sometimes might ap-
3. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV.
1363 (2000).
4. See id. at 1434-36. Adler argues that "[s] tigma is not even sufficient, let alone neces-
sary, for status harm." Id. at 1436. He illustrates this by noting that "the cultural impact of
[the government's stigmatizing] messages is contingent on additional factors, such as
whether... voters are even listening to what the.., officials are trying to tell them." Id. at
1436.
5. See id. at 1434 (arguing that "it is only contingently true that a [stigmatizing] state-
ment by the government... will cause" harm to the well-being of the targeted group).
6. See id. at 1435-36 (arguing that harm comes not from inferior status itself, but from
the possible consequences of that status).
7. Id. Adler reiterates this point pithily in Linguistic Meaning, Nonlinguistic "Expres-
sion, "and the Multiple Variants of Expressivism: A Reply to Professors Anderson and Pildes, 148 U.
PA. L. REV. 1577, 1590-91 (2000).
8. The most prominent response to Adler is an elaborate restatement of expressivist
theory, Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1503 (2000), but as Steven D. Smith observes, their discus-
sion does not include "any argument that actually explains the focus of their approach on
expression as the criterion of moral value or legal validity." Steven D. Smith, Expressivist
Jurisprudence and the Depletion of Meaning, 60 MD. L. REv. 506, 567 (2001). Deborah
Hellman similarly observes that Anderson and Pildes's article "is largely explanatory rather
than justificatory," and offers no "account of why the expressive dimension of action ought
to matter in its own right." Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances: Professional Ethics,
Expressive Government, and the Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 MD. L. REV. 653, 674
(2001).
9. On first reading this exchange, I did not think I had ever taken a side on the
question that Adler addresses, even though I am one of Adler's named targets. See Adler,
supra note 3, at 1371, 1433. The reason, I think, is that my book, Antidiscrimination Law and
Social Equality, examines theories of Equal Protection that stress the cultural meaning of
government decisions as either evidence of impermissible motive or as likely to promote
social inequality, but does not consider (what no then-extant theory focused on) the intrin-
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propriately turn on expressive considerations.)" He repeatedly
stresses the contingency of the connection between what an action
expresses and its effect on social practices." But he does not deny
that contingent connections can be stable enough over time to be a
sound basis for legal (even constitutional) doctrine. One might con-
ceivably have a just society without the Fourteenth Amendment (be-
cause the society had no history of racial subordination) or the
Establishment Clause (because it had no history of religious conflict).
But that does not change the fact that in America, the problems to
which these provisions respond have persisted for centuries. And in
both cases, the connection between expression and status is a strong
one. Moreover, Adler also concedes that the institutional limitations
of the judiciary might provide a good reason for selecting rules of law
that focus on expression, which may be a good proxy for the perni-
cious causal sequences that the law seeks to disrupt.' 2
sic constitutional significance of that meaning. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION
LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY (1996). This gap in the literature has been filled by Deborah
Hellman's excellent article, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1
(2000), though Hellman pays less attention to foundational concerns than I do here.
10. See Adler, supra note 3, at 1401-03, 1437; Adler, supra note 4, at 1593-94.
11. E.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 1468.
12. Id. at 1437; Adler, supra note 4, at 1593-94. Although Adler offers an "overview"
and Anderson and Pildes a "restatement," neither describes all the ways in which the ex-
pressive meaning of a law can be morally and legally relevant. I cannot do that here, but a
brief taxonomy may help to locate both my disagreement with Adler and my unhappiness
with the way that Anderson and Pildes have answered him. A law's expressive meaning
may be significant for the following three reasons:
I. What it reveals about the process by which it came into being. ("Meaning" here is used in
the Gricean sense of nonlinguistic meaning.) See Adler, supra note 3, at 1384-85 (discuss-
ing H. P. Grice's definition of nonlinguistic meaning). This is what Anderson and Pildes
have in mind when they offer the cases of the shoplifter whose furtive glances betray her
intentions, see Anderson & Pildes, supra note 8, at 1508, or the white emergency rescue
workers who "prefer[ I to resuscitate white victims at mixed-race disaster scenes," id. at
1528. There are areas of constitutional law in which an impermissible intent can invalidate
a law, most notably in the case of a racially discriminatory intent. See Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). For the leading defense of
this approach, seeJoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 136-45 (1980) (discussing why
a discriminatory intent standard is desirable); see also KOPPELMAN, supra note 9, at 13-56
(surveying process-based theories of Equal Protection).
Adler is not interested in this consideration, but it is what Anderson and Pildes appear
to be primarily concerned with, though they weaken the constitutional requirements un-
necessarily by relying on Margaret Gilbert's theory of collective agents. See Anderson &
Pildes, supra note 8, at 1515 (citing, with approval, Gilbert's argument that groups which
"(1) can properly refer to themselves as 'we,' and (2) make normative claims upon one
another in virtue of their belonging to the 'we'" can be "meaningfully ascribe [d] purposes,
beliefs, and other mental states" (quoting MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 204
(1989))). If a law would not have passed but for the legislators' racism, it should not
matter whether (as Gilbert's theory requires) the legislators were jointly committed to a
racist result; the law is still invalid even if each was expressing his own racism in an uncoor-
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Still, there are contexts in which Adler's claims matter, because
there are some situations in the world that approximate the predica-
ment of Rex's citizens. A prominent example is that of gays, who are
stigmatized by unenforced sodomy laws.' 3 They are arguably stigma-
tized once more when the law responds to the demand for same-sex
marriage by creating a second-class "civil union" status, as it has in
Vermont, with all the tangible benefits of marriage, but with the hon-
orific tide of "marriage" withheld.' 4 Do gays have anything to com-
plain about in Vermont?' 5 The answer turns on whether Adler is
dinated (or even unconscious) way. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego,
and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); David
A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935 (1989).
Anderson and Pildes's reliance on Gilbert also produces intractable difficulties when it is
combined with the idea that the norm of equal concern and respect can be breached by
failures and omissions, as when persons negligently toss beer bottles on my lawn, see Ander-
son & Pildes, supra note 8, at 1527, or when teenagers blare their car horns late at night,
oblivious to the fact that others are trying to sleep, see id. at 1512-13. In neither case can it
make any sense to say that the actors have collectively committed themselves to their
thoughtlessness. For a discussion of the difficulties of relying on Gilbert in this context
(which in no way impugns Gilbert herself, who was addressing different questions), see
Simon Blackburn, Group Minds and Expressive Harm, 60 MD. L. REv. 467, 472-76 (2001).
II. The objective significance of the law itself read in light of the social practices, conventions,
and contexts in which it occurs. Here what matters is not intentions, but the law's "public
meaning," which is "a product of interpreting the norm in the full context in which it is
adopted and implemented." Anderson & Pildes, supra note 8, at 1524, 1525. An example
would be sad music, which does not necessarily indicate that the musicians or composer
are sad, and need not make the audience sad. Id. at 1508. It is with respect to the signifi-
cance of public meaning, per se, that I am joining issue with Adler here. Anderson and
Pildes do not engage this issue directly, because when they examine public meaning, they
appear to be primarily concerned with what public meanings reveal about the actor's state
of mind, including, perhaps, the actor's failures and omissions. See, e.g., id. at 1524-25.
III. The material and cultural consequences of the law. Adler freely concedes that expres-
sive conduct may have (good or bad) consequences, but insists that consequences do not
automatically follow from expression. Adler, supra note 3, at 1434-36. I have no disagree-
ment with him here. See KOPPELMAN, supra note 9, at 57-114 (discussing result-based Equal
Protection theories). Consequences matter. The question is whether they are all that
matters.
13. See RicHARD D. MOHR, GAYs/JUsTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAw 60
(1988) ("[U]nenforced sodomy laws are the chief systematic way that society as a whole
tells gays that they are scum.").
14. See 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves 91 (to be codified in scattered sections of VT. STAT.
ANN. tits. 4, 8, 14, 15, 18, 32, 33), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2000/acts/
ACT091.htm.
15. To help readers who are having difficulty understanding what the complaint might
be, I offer the following hypothetical: For centuries, American law prohibited interracial
marriages. At one time or another, forty-one American colonies and states prohibited
them. Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of "Race" in Twentieth-
Century America, 83J. Am. HIsT. 44, 49 (1996). By the time the Supreme Court invalidated
these laws in 1967, they were still on the books in sixteen states. Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1, 6 n.5 (1967). Suppose that, before the Court's decision, Virginia had created a
status for interracial couples called "civil unions," with all the legal rights of marriage, but
780
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correct. Are expressive wrongs bad in themselves, or are they bad only
because of their contingent connection to tangible injuries?
The core of Adler's article offers a general argument why expres-
sive theories cannot be persuasive. His method is ingenious and ele-
gant: to "construct a progressively refined and sophisticated picture
of the moral criteria governing (or plausibly governing) legal deci-
sions, starting from the simple core of preference-utilitarianism and
then adding new moral considerations or refining existing ones. ' 6
He moves from the various forms of utilitarianism, through various
forms of non-utilitarian consequentialism, deontology, and specifically
political theories.' 7 At no point does the developing theory become
expressive. At no point does morality dictate that expressive harm can
count, per se, as an injury. And from this, he concludes that the legal
status of inferior cannot be, in itself, harmful for anyone. 8
The persuasiveness of the argument depends on the thorough-
ness of its canvassing of possible moral considerations. And here is
where it fails. A major strand of Western moral and political thought,
led by Rousseau and Hegel, is entirely ignored by Adler's survey. That
tradition emphasizes two moral factors that Adler neglects.
The first consideration is the human need for recognition. Peo-
ple want and deserve to be respected. Insult is a wrong even if it is
accompanied by no tangible harm, loss of status, or even psychic dis-
tress. Justice Thurgood Marshall liked to tell the following story about
tourists who mistakenly entered the Justices' private elevator:
Finding a lone black man standing there, [the tourists] said,
"First floor please." "Yowsa, yowsa," Marshall responded as
he pretended to operate the automated elevator and held
the door for the tourists as they left. Marshall regularly re-
counted the story, noting the tourists' puzzlement and then
confusion as they watched him walk off, and later realized
who he was.' 9
Marshall does not appear to have experienced any psychic dis-
tress at all as a result of this episode. On the contrary, it seems to have
given him pleasure, and the pleasure was compounded every time he
had the opportunity to repeat the story. But it does not follow that he
was not insulted, and therefore wronged, by the tourists' behavior. (If
not the title. Would the interracial couple have had anything left to complain of?. Would
they have had standing to challenge the law?
16. Adler, supra note 3, at 1462.
17. See id. at 1462-93.
18. See supra notes 4-4 and accompanying text.
19. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 64 (Avon Books 1981).
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insult does not count, then does it follow that the tourists had no
good reason to feel embarrassed or apologetic?)
Justice Marshall suffered no tangible harm from the insult. A
person might disprefer being treated this way, but, as Adler notes,
"then again he might disprefer anything." 0 How can anyone have a
standing obligation to respect his (possibly idiosyncratic) preference
not to be harmlessly insulted?
Yet it is a stretch to regard this preference as an idiosyncratic one.
Adler appears to assume without argument that the desire to have
one's value recognized and acknowledged is just one preference
among all the others, like chocolate ice cream and cotton under-
wear." Some of the principal philosophers in the Western canon
have thought, on the contrary, that the desire for recognition "is not
just another desire that we happen to have; it is the core human de-
sire, central to our sense of well-being, our sense of who and what we
are."22 Rousseau, for example, thought that amour-propre, which can
be roughly translated as pride or vanity, is the fundamentally human
passion, that which distinguishes us from the animals. 23  Hegel
thought that the desire for recognition was the basic substrate of all
human relations. 24 And this view is not peculiar to these long-dead
philosophers. 25  Recognition is one of the fundamental themes of
20. Adler, supra note 4, at 1590.
21. See id. Nietzsche heaped scorn on this kind of utilitarian effort to level all human
desires to a single currency. "If we have our own why of life, we shall get along with almost
any how. Man does not strive for pleasure; only the Englishman does." Friedrich Nietzsche,
Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 463, 468 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans.,
1968). For a more systematic critique of this kind of levelling, see T.M. Scanlon, Preference
and Urgency, 72J. PHIL. 655 (1975).
22. STEVEN B. SMITH, HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM: RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 117 (1989).
23. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among
Men, in THE FIRST AND SECOND DISCOURSES 77, 222 (Roger D. Masters ed., Roger D. &
Judith R. Masters trans., St. Martin's Press 1964) (1755) (describing vanity as "a relative
sentiment, artificial and born in society, which inclines each individual to have a greater
esteem for himself than for anyone else" and distinguishing this concept from "[l]ove of
oneself," which is "a natural sentiment which inclines every animal to watch over its own
preservation").
24. I describe the pertinent views of Rousseau and Hegel in greater detail, with numer-
ous citations, in Andrew Koppelman, Sex Equality and/or the Family: From Bloom vs. Okin to
Rousseau vs. Hegel, 4 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 399, 408-10, 416-20 (1992) (book review).
25. For a short review of Rousseau's continuing importance, see Allan Bloom, Rous-
seau-The Turning Point, in CONFRONTING THE CONSTITUTION 211 (Allan Bloom ed., 1990).
On Hegel's influence, see CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 537-71 (1975).
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modern political life, pervading questions of multiculturalism, femi-
nism, nationalism, and cultural separatism.26
The demand for recognition is not per se a political one. It has
no necessary relation to politics. Both Rousseau and Hegel envi-
sioned its emergence in a state of nature. 27 Hegel's famous master-
slave dialectic arises out of the clash of two consciousnesses in a wil-
derness in which there is no law, but only a struggle to the death. 28
And it was not the state that looked at Justice Marshall and saw an
elevator operator. (Marshall himself is the only state official in the
story.)
Steven D. Smith has asked whether the argument just described
"is actually another kind of consequentialist argument. If we all have
a psychological need for respect, why isn't causing the state to recog-
nize and satisfy that need an argument about good consequences? ' 29
There is a sense in which it is, although it is not reducible to the utili-
tarianism-plus-deontology that Adler espouses, and so the point could
be taken as a minor amendment to Adler's consequentialism. On the
other hand, the gap between intrinsic wrong and consequentialist
wrong becomes awfully narrow here. If recognition is a good thing in
itself, then we do not really care about consequences that happen con-
tingently to follow from it. The sort of scientific analysis of causal reg-
ularities that Adler calls for would not be helpful here. Rather, the
wrong Justice Marshall suffered was complete in itself before any con-
sequences followed from it. The way to prevent this particular bad
consequence from ensuing would not be to figure out what its social
causes are, but to monitor expressive behavior to determine whether
insult has occurred.
When one turns to political considerations, Smith's objection
evaporates. There is nothing consequentialist about the contractarian
objection to second-class citizenship. Politics matters, because it can
(and, according to both philosophers, does) transform the desire for
recognition into a right to recognition. Both thought that the state
was, above all, a response to the struggle for recognition. For both,
the point and purpose of government was to set up a framework
whereby each person's desire for recognition was satisfied. Rousseau's
26. This is argued with characteristic elegance by Charles Taylor in The Politics of Recog-
nition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1994).
27. See generally RoussAu, supra note 23; G. W. F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
(A. V. Miller trans., 1977) (1807).
28. See HEGEL, supra note 27, at 111-19.
29. Personal communication from Steven D. Smith (Oct. 11, 2000).
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social contract is designed to prevent the oppression that arises when
one person rules over another: "as each gives himself to all, he gives
himself to no one; and since there is no associate over whom one does
not acquire the same right one grants him over oneself, one gains the
equivalent of everything one loses, and more force to preserve what
one has." ° While Rousseau's goal is the negative one of preventing
tyranny, for Hegel, juridical recognition is a positive good. For Hegel,
the right of recognition "is not simply a contingent feature of the
modern state; it is its inner soul and purpose. '31 The state, by accord-
ing legal equality to persons, "unites men in an inward manner,
whereas needs and necessity bring them together only externally."32
The idea of recognition these thinkers invoke is implicitly at the root
of much of contemporary Fourteenth Amendment scholarship, nota-
bly Kenneth Karst's celebrated "principle of equal citizenship, which
presumptively guarantees to each individual the right to be treated by
the organized society as a respected, responsible, and participating
member."
33
If these theories are accepted, then Rex's laws are unjust for two
reasons. First, they are insulting. And second, the insult is made
more serious by the fact that it emanates from the state, the entity that
exists precisely in order to accord to persons' recognition. Rex's laws
contradict a central reason for having a state in the first place.
Now, I have merely described these views. I have not defended
them and will not attempt to do so here. Perhaps Rousseau, Hegel,
and the legions of thinkers influenced by them are wrong. But Adler
has not shown that they are. Until these ideas are refuted, the suspi-
cion will remain that there is something wrong with Rex's regime, and
that legal status matters.
30. JEAN-JACQUES RoussEAu, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 53 (Roger D. Masters ed.,Judith
R. Masters trans., St. Martin's Press 1978) (1762).
31. SMITH, supra note 22, at 123.
32. G. W. F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND § 431Z, at 171 (William Wallace trans., Clar-
endon Press 1971) (1807).
33. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 4 (1977).
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